Kenya’s recent elections descended into ethnic strife and chaos when the opposition leader, Raila Odinga, of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and his supporters grew frustrated by delays in releasing the election results. Violent protests broke out between President Mwai Kibaki’s Party of National Unity (PNU) and ODM supporters. An important component to the dispute was old ethic tensions between the Luo and Kikuyu tribes, supporting Odinga and Kibaki respectively.

The ODM later claimed victory after official figures gave Odinga a four percentage point lead over Kibaki on three quarters of the count. Later the results showed that Kibaki was in the lead, which the opposition said was on account on vote rigging. Both parties and their leaders claimed leadership when the Electoral Commission of Kenya stopped reporting results for a night. While Kibaki was being sworn in, having been declared the winner by the electoral commission, violence erupted on the streets. International observers commented on the elections at the time, saying that credibility of the tallying of the votes could not rule out suspicions about the accuracy of the presidential result. The electoral commission compounded the uncertainty by delaying the release of final results.

 These were only the second elections following the dismantling of a constitutional provision banning other political parties. It was also the first election during which the indirect grip of Kenya’s past rulers began to slip, with a real contest between presidential candidates opening up. Kibaki came to power in 2002, defeating a party that had been in power for 39 years, ushering in a new multiparty democratic era for Kenya. 

In the ensuing Kenyan conflict a thousand people were killed, more than 1,200 women were raped, more than 300,000 people were internally displaced and the number of wounded people went uncounted ( http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/ASIN-7D4RD8?OpenDocument). Television footage of urban residents firing bows and arrows at each other showed how severely destructive violence could arise despite the general absence of modern weapons and a strong security force presence. 

The conflict was finally brought under control when the two political parties signed a peace deal which provided for constitutional changes which would allow for the post of prime minister to be established, alongside the presidency, and the formation of a coalition government between the ODM and the PNU (Mail and Guardian, 7 March 2008).

In many respects the current uncertainty and potential further unraveling in Zimbabwe mirrors events in Kenya. Both countries are former British colonies. Kenya earned its independence some years before Zimbabwe although both successions involved violence largely directed at the white settler community and which also ripped open old ethnic conflict. Following independence both states adopted de-facto single party government. In Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, of the Kenya African Union (KAU) was in power from December 1964 to August 1978 without real opposition and even passed a constitutional amendment disallowing other political movements. In the Zimbabwe case Robert Mugabe prevented a number of his opponents including Joshua Nkomo from presenting any opposition to his government.

There are also differences between the two. Kenya was regarded as a stable and emerging democratic state as East Africa’s largest economy. Critical inspection would have revealed its political stability to be less than exemplary but impressions are powerful in forming public and international opinion about events within states. Zimbabwe on the other hand has for a number of years been regarded as the basket case of Africa. Its economy has been in steep decline in contrast to that of Kenya’s. There was however a period in the 1980s when Zimbabwe was regarded as stable despite the ravages of the security forces in Matabeleland. One of the most controversial topics of post colonial African government, land reform, also displays differences between the two countries. Kenya managed its land problems without collapsing the economy which cannot be said for Zimbabwe.    

From this analysis, the similarities outweigh the differences.

• Both countries staged presidential elections

• The elections came after a sustained period of effective single party rule
• The main candidates represented the anti-colonial past and a new and brighter future

• In both cases opposition parties declared an early victory

• The final results were delayed, frustrating the supporters  

The failure of definite action, for Kenya, led to uncertainty which in turn led to violence. The same could be the case for Zimbabwe. It has been five days since the elections and the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission has still not released results on the presidential election. The Zimbabwean police have raided the opposition offices, and foreign journalists have been jailed. These are ominous signs that Mugabe is resisting defeat.  He could declare a 90-day delay to a presidential run-off election if there was no clear winner. This would give his security forces time to clamp down. The law requires a run-off be held within 21 days of an election, but Mugabe could change that with a presidential decree.

The critical failure in both processes was the delay in the reporting of the electoral outcome, and a possible paralysis in implementing the outcome/holding the political parties to account in countries familiar with dictatorial rule. The possible invalidation of the results by various stakeholders, including observers, meant the elections lacked credibility, leaving citizens with seemingly no formal channels for redress, and thus violence being punted as the effective option. 

In Zimbabwe’s case this analysis would not be complete without some attention being given to South Africa’s role in the crisis. Despite Thabo Mbeki’s claims that he was impotent to influence events in Zimbabwe, and that Zimbabweans must forge genuine change internally by themselves, and his willful efforts to mislead the outside world that there was good progress in his mediation efforts, it remains the case that South Africa was the regional economic powerhouse throughout the economic collapse of Zimbabwe.

It is difficult to imagine how if Mbeki had placed the pressure on Mugabe that Vorster did on Smith, just two decades before, the outcomes would have been different. In Vorster and Smith’s era South Africa’s action forced the Rhodesians to consider a negotiated settlement. In Mbeki/Mugabe era Mugabe was offered substantially more negotiating room and moreover room to delay serious negotiations. If electoral violence does break out in Zimbabwe South Africa’s inaction and thus partial tacit culpability cannot be denied. 

Admittedly such a hypothesis could be challenged. What cannot be as easily refuted is the case that South Africa’s tacit support for Mugabe caused him to believe that he could survive for further terms in office as he had the support of the regional powerhouse. In evidence of this one need only refer to the questionable declarations by South African observer groups  that the previous elections in Zimbabwe were free and fair; insinuations made by our foreign affairs department that opposition to Zimbabwe’s land reform process was racist and furthermore; Mbeki’s efforts to keep Zimbabwe in the commonwealth.

It must also be acknowledged that the same analysis cannot be made for Kenya as it was arguably the East African economic powerhouse.        

The lessons from both events should nonetheless inform electoral observation, political transition, and regional policy when dealing with future elections and dictatorial regimes in Africa. For South Africa too, the similarities are perhaps beginning to outweigh the differences.   

- Hannah Botsis and Frans Cronje

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Regards,

Frans Cronje, Deputy CEO