SAIRR Today: An early forecast of South Africa’s 2009 election results - 22nd January 2009
Based on current opinion polls and past electoral performances the Institute has deduced a likely outcome for the 2009 elections.
Based on past performances and current opinion polls the Institute has forecast the parliamentary seat allocations for 2009.
Following the 2004 elections the ANC won 69.8% of the seats in parliament, the DA took 12.5%, and the IFP took 7%. The remaining 10.7% was split between nine smaller opposition parties ranging from the UDM at 2.3% to AZAPO at 0.3%.
It has been speculated that the 2009 results could look very different. The ANC is under pressure and the emergence of COPE and the re-launch of the DA could see the opposition make significant gains. To date opinion polls have been inconclusive and are not showing common trends. Many of these polls suffer from high no-response rates. One poll has shown for example that a third of black voters and just under half of white voters are still undecided in who they will vote for. It might be possible though, through a process of deduction, to get very close to what the final results may be.
The ANC is indeed under pressure. Its leadership has been chaotic and infighting has damaged its standing. It is too early though to say that it is disintegrating. It appears as if Stalinist tendencies in the party are beginning to come through very strongly. Rather than destroying the party these may come to sustain it as it abuses state resources and places itself beyond the reach of the rule of law. Together with the fact that its service delivery record is far more successful than is often acknowledged and that a quarter of the population today depends on its largesse in the form of handouts it is unlikely that the party will poll below 66% of seats in parliament.
How might the other 34% then be divided?
The 10.7% of seats distributed amongst a host of smaller opposition parties is unlikely to change much. The current support for parties such as the ACDP, the FF+, and the ID appears to be pretty solid. Even if these parties were to lose 20% of their supporters that would only introduce a further 2% of seats into the national melting pot. It is reasonable at this stage to suggest that the smaller opposition parties will walk away with at least 8% of parliamentary seats.
That then leaves 26% of seats to be distributed between COPE, the IFP, and the DA.
At 7% of parliamentary seats in 2004 IFP support reached its lowest point since 1994. It is possible therefore that its support might further decline. The fact that a Zulu now leads the ANC may further threaten the IFP’s traditional Zulu support base. It is also possible though that the distilled IFP support base is now a fundamental support base and will not alter much between 2004 and 2009. So even if the IFP is to shed a further 20% of its supporters it is still likely to be returned to parliament with at least 5% of seats.
The remaining 21% of seats must be split between the DA and COPE.
When the UDM of Roelf Meyer and Bantu Holomisa entered the political scene amidst much fanfare in 1999 their party won just under 5% of seats in parliament. This UDM’s performance is the best model we have against which to assess the potential performance of COPE. As a starting point COPE therefore seems assured of 5% of seats in parliament. It is, however, a party operating on bigger scale and with a more high profile leadership than the UDM. This is despite the fact that it has attracted such a mix of malcontents into its leadership that future infighting may prove it to be nothing more than a one-hit-wonder party. It can still be expected though that that one hit will be bigger than that of the UDM. It would be surprising therefore were COPE to win less than 8% of seats.
That would leave 13% for the DA. DA support appears over past elections to have peaked at around 12% of voters. These voters have demonstrated themselves to be loyal DA supporters. But they have arguably never been offered an attractive black opposition party to vote for. This week the DA leader, Helen Zille, argued a good case for her party on the pages of Business Day juxtaposing her vision of an ‘open society’ against the ‘closed crony state’ of the ANC. But she errs in not paying sufficient regard to the fact that as a party dominated by white South Africans the DA finds itself at a perpetual disadvantage in attracting black support. While arguing the principle that race should not matter in politics the DA can’t escape the fact that it unfortunately does. At the same time the core black middle class, which may in many respects identify with the values of the DA’s traditional white support base, is significantly smaller than the figures often reported in the media. If the DA were to lose 20% of its support base to COPE then the race between the two parties to become the official opposition is in fact too close to call particularly when considering the high no-response rates in existing opinion polls for white voters.
At this early stage it appears as if the new parliament of 2009 might be made up as follows:
• ANC at least 66%
• IFP 5%
• Smaller opposition parties 8%
• The DA and COPE with 21% to share between them with the final
outcome too early to call and now resting on the campaign success of
the two parties.
The election date is still to be announced and politically a great deal could happen between now and voting day. The final make up of parliament for 2009 should therefore differ to some degree from what has been suggested here. But it would be surprising if the results were so significantly different that they were contrary to this forecast.
This early edition of SAIRR Today was posted on Thursday 22nd January. Future editions will as usual be posted before noon on a Friday. Use the RSS feeds on this page to get SAIRR Today on your desktop.
- Frans Cronje
Gotta hope!
In the minds of enough black voters the glory of the 'liberation struggle' has worn very thin as a result of non-delivery over many years and what are now seen to be totally false promises of a better life - this must count severely against the ANC at this point in history - but whereas there was no credible and acceptable 'black' party to vote for previously the formation of COPE has provided that acceptable alternative for many blacks.
Indeed, COPE may well be viewed as the catalyst which brought true democratic elections to SA for the first time - for up till now the obscene majority of the ANC has in fact led to a virtual one-party state.
SAIRR Today: The great empowerment hoax (and how it saved South Africa’s economy) -11th March 2010
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Highly disputed
There are three key facts which must mark the beginning of any analysis.
Firstly, when the ANC was in full cry (1999; 2004) they (in its original, united format) were receiving upper 60's in support. A lot has happened since then and the country has changed markedly. But to keep it simple, lets say that ANC and COPE support, when added together, should come to between 70-75%. In other words, the broad ANC is dominant as it always was.
The second indisputable fact is one that is really picked up on by the media. But it is absilutely crucial nonetheless. Jacob Zuma won at Polokwane - but only with 59% of the vote. A full 40% of the ANC did not vote for him (in a secret ballot). This is not an opinion poll. Nor was it a vote of the upper, ruling elite. It is the best measure of grass-roots ANC support for the two factions.
Simple Maths tells us that 60% of 70% is equal to 42%. I'm not asking for miracles - I'm not even asking for a change in the reality of the political situation. In the 2009 general elections, if SA voters vote the way they did in 2004, and if ANC supporters vote the way they did at Polokwane, Zuma's ANC will fall well short of the 50% needed to rule the country without a coalition partner.
This brings me on to my third and final point - one that is equally important. Quite simply: The ANC has no friends. The magic of Mandela is gone. Faith in the Mbeki Project has evaporated. Zuma will enjoy no honeymoon. A coalition with the DA is unthinkable. The ID, once partners in 2004 and 2006, has - with the coloured vote - turned sharply into opposition. Julius Malema has insulted Buthelezi's wife (and every other party for that matter). The ACDP is fed up - as is just about everyone else - the PAC, UDM, UCDP... quite simply the ANC will not find a coalition partner anywhere.
This is absolutely groundbreaking! I do not for a minute dispute that the ANC will "win" the elections, insofar as they get the most votes. Hey, my analysis says they could easily get twice as many votes as their nearest competitor. But according to the Constitution that counts for absolutely nothing at all. What matters is who can put together a coalition of parties that gets more than 50% of the vote.
Now, I can already hear the explanations coming thick and fast. Yes, but the masses will vote for the ANC regardless. Those who voted for Mbeki will remain loyal to the ANC. Zuma is charming the masses. Polokwane was a long time ago - the masses will have forgotten any hard feelings.
This is the debate, I feel, that is critical one when analysing this election. Let me quickly introduce a statistic I call the X-factor: the proportion of traditional ANC support that will defect specifically to COPE. I mentioned earlier that the big ANC had about 70-75% support. Some of that will be lost to the DA, ID (lots of coloureds will vote elsewhere), the ACDP etc. And lets say that a roughly equal number of Zulus will shift from the IFP to Zuma's ANC. Basically, what I'm saying is lets presume that the big ANC's support is still at 70%. I don't think this is too controversial. Some may say that the Zulu vote pushes it up higher - I don't think so. The IFP was weakened last time round so most Zulus were already voting ANC before Zuma came along. Besides, this should be balanced by many who will ditch the ANC to go to the DA.
So then, if broad ANC support stands at 70%, what X-factor is required to push Zuma into opposition? In other words, what proportion of old ANC voters need to defect to COPE to push the 2009 ANC below 50%? The maths is fairly simple: if 21 out of 70 leave to go to COPE, Zuma will be left with 49. 21 out of 70 is exactly 30%. So to push the ANC below 50% nationally, COPE doesn't have to win MORE than Zuma. The DA doesn't have to make massive inroads into the ANC vote. Buthelezi doesn't have to hang on to the Zulus. All that needs to happen is that COPE must take three out of ten ANC voters with them. Considering that Mbeki won four out of ten ANC voters at Polokwane, this may seem in the ball park... Put another way - Zuma has to win 70% of ANC supporters to win this election. Anything less and he's in real, real trouble.
70% of ANC voters sounds like a big number doesn't it? Even if broad ANC support stands at 80% - not 67/69/70% - Zuma would still have to win 51 out of 80 = 64% of ANC voters. This is still above the mark he got at Polokwane (59%). In fact, if Zuma were to only win 59% of ANC support in April 2009, that would mean that ANC support must be around 86% of the South African electorate - far too high even for the ANC. The conclusion is inescapable, if Polokwane is repeated in April 2009, Zuma will come short of 50% nationally.
In response to the earlier argument that the masses will remain loyal (i.e. the X-factor wont be nearly as high as it was in Polokwane) there are good reasons to think that the X-factor wont actually be that weak. Firstly, although Zuma only won 59% at Polokwane, his regime has done ABSOLUTELY NOTHING to reconcile with the other 40%. During the last 15 months the Mbeki clan has been made most unwelcome in the ANC. Five Mbeki era premiers were kicked out, Mbeki himself was fired in September, non Zuma supporters have been called snakes, dogs and cockroaches and Zuma's inner circle has been made up almost entirely of his people. Furthermore, creatures like Julius Malema have been given free reign to go crazy.
But perhaps most importantly, the factor that will boost the X-factor most will be Zuma himself. He divides South Africa and the ANC like no-one else. There will be many in the ANC who will not want him as their leader due to his corruption allegations, views on women and AIDS statements. Were someone else chosen to be the ANC's presidential candidate, (i.e. Kgalema Motlanthe or Cyril Ramaphosa) the X-factor would probably be far lower and the ANC would cruise to a big victory.
Interestingly, the women constituency is one area in which Zuma's ANC could come horribly unstuck on election day. I personally get the feeling that in South African politics only the loudest, brashest voices ever get heard. So when we read about Malema every second day we tend to think that all South Africans are like him. What I'm saying is that although the POLITICIANS all support Zuma (they will need to use him later), the PEOPLE, especially women, quietly do not support him to the same extent. With SA having so many women who have been raped etc., (and considering they make up 50% of the country) I think there could be many who don't vote for Zuma or stay at home on election day. The key thing I'm saying is that whilst the politicians support Zuma loudly, the people are less public in their disapproval. However, although that disapproval isn't vented in our newspapers and TV shows, it is there nonetheless and will emerge in the ballot box on election day.
To be honest, I can't give a serious prediction of what the X-factor will come to on April 22. Markinor has polls out showing that 50% over ANC supporters feel unsure who to vote for. There are plenty of polls showing ANC support collapsing in areas. In the Cape they certainly will be lucky to get 20%. On the other hand, COPE looks like a bunch of sore losers, (may I say "sell-outs to the whites"), ANC support was dented but not by up to 30% in the January 20 by-elections. But then turn out in the by-elections was 20%. Maybe the masses will indeed turn out for Zuma and he'll rack up 70%+.
Who knows really...
Perhaps most importantly, the opposition parties have not defined themselves into an alternative yet. The concept of a "Rainbow Coalition for a Rainbow Nation" has not been publicised enough. The DA, IFP, UDM and now COPE have bad reputations individually. People wont vote for the DA because they are "white," the IFP because they "sold out to Botha during Apartheid", COPE because they're just "sore losers trying to save their career etc etc.
But they may be persuaded to vote for a Rainbow Coalition...
Holomisa - Zille - Buthelezi - De Lille - Shilowa - Lekota - Meshoe - Pheko.
Now there's a (not very white) alternative brand you could sell. Of the 8 leaders, 6 are black, one is coloured, one is white and two are women. Why aren't they're exploiting this idea????
But importantly, we need more serious opinion polling done in South Africa. Making predictions without good material is really pointless and frustrating. And so - like anyone else - I would hate to have to make a prediction for the elections in 2009, but I'll have a go anyway, listing outcomes in order of certainty...
1) The ANC will lose their two thirds majority in Parliament.
2) The ANC will win more than 50% of the vote
3) The ANC will win less than 60% of the vote.
I don't know which side of 55% the ANC will come, but I think 55% is a decent figure to go with for now.
Interestingly, in order for 55% to be the figure on the day, that would mean that 15% would probably be COPE's figure. (55% + 15% = the ANC's orignial 70%) This would mean that the X-factor would stand at around 21%. (That is about half of what it was at Polokwane - 41%). In other words, around half of the Mbeki crew will revolt and go with COPE, with the other half remainging loyal to the ANC.
But, although regime change will only really be likely in 2014, lets take a minute to dream about what we could wake up to on April 23rd...
You roll out of bed turn on the TV and the ANC has got... 48%. COPE got 20%, the DA got just less with 18%, De Lille brought in 5%, Buthelezi 4% and the rest was split. Most people will shrug, say the ANC hammered COPE and the DA and go back to sleep.
In most democracies around the world 48% would be a landslide. But not here. In the current South Africa with the current ANC, getting 49, 48 or 47% would be the same for the ruling party as stepping off the edge of a cliff. Over the following hours, the ANC will gradually come to terms with the extent of the disaster. To Zille's dismay, COPE will enter negotiations with their old Comrades to form a unity government. They will put certain demands on the table, and it will look like they have a deal.
But a few days later, talks will break down, and that's when Lekota will make some dramatic announcement: COPE will form a grand Rainbow Coalition to force the ANC into opposition. (Yes, that's right, the party that got twice as much support as anyone else will be in opposition!). COPE (20) + DA (18) + ID (5) + IFP (4) = 47%. The ANC is still on 48%. A few smaller parties are roped in too - ACDP (1) + UDM (1) = 49% for the coaltion. The deadlock will come down to the FF+ and the PAC. The PAC will remind the nation that they still hate white people - but will say that after careful consideration they've decided that they hate the ANC more. Their support will push the coalition over the 50% threshold. A Rainbow Government will be proclaimed, Cabinet posts will be dished out to everyone and a President will be selected (from COPE).
That is when all hell will break loose. COSATU will call massive strikes, demanding that 'the result of the election be respected.' The DA will say that the result IS being respected - read the rules in the Constitution you fools. The ANCYL will go beserk with Malema threatening to kill just about everyone. From here on in - I don't have a clue.
But before you laugh - this scenario is not entirely implausible. You just need an X-factor of 30%...
THE OPPOSITION PARTIES
As for the DA - I seem to be painting them into their old corner. That seems a bit unfair, as their transformation under Helen Zille has been dramatic. Tony Leon's "Fight Back" campaign seems a distant memory and Zille is after all the World's Best Mayor. That's got to count for something, right?
Well yes. The DA certainly wont be LOSING any of its 2004 support - except for those who have emigrated. And they should pick up quite a lot of black and coloured support. Certainly there is an air of desperation in the country which was not felt in the Madiba year of 1999 or even 2004. They got 12,5% in 2004. I reckon that they should receive between 14 -17%. However, they do appear to be the real alternative to the Mbeki/Zuma drama, and provided the right wing Tony Leonites are banished forever, then the party's prospects in 2014 (and the 2011 local government elections) actually look quite exciting. (Experts say that by 2011, SA's electricity and water supply will have collapsed).
Patricia de Lille's Independent Democrats should do well. The ANC used to attract serious Coloured support. However the days of Mandela walking arm in arm with Geraldine Frasier-Moleketi are long gone. As is Ebrahim Rasool. Furthermore, the main Coloured leaders are firmly against the ANC, with some Coloured nationalist feeling growing. Besides De Lille, Allan Boesak and others are working against the ruling party. It's hard to think of a prominent coloured leader in Zuma's ANC. Opinion polls show that the coloureds have broken from the ANC big time. With 9% of the population, expect de Lille's ID to get around 5% nationally.
Mangosuthu Buthelezi's IFP is in serious trouble. The party is traditionally a Zulu Royalist group. When they ran the show in KZN back in the 1990's they were only getting around 10% nationally. In 2004 they got less than 7% nationally. Now that a Zulu pleb is running the ANC, expect the IFP to get hammered. They will be lucky to get 4% nationally, but will still prove to be a useful (black) face in a potential Rainbow Coalition and may provide crucial support to the coalition in tight provinces.
Bantu Holomisa's UDM has never really been that significant. They got 2% in 2004. That might go up a bit, or down a bit. Who knows. Put them down to being another useful face in a Rainbow Coaltion.
As for the ACDP (2% in 2004), PAC (1% in 2004) and anyone else, see the UDM above.
The FF+ might capitalise on some unhappy white right wing vote. They got 1% in 2004. Importantly, the Rainbow Coalition can't use these guys as then they really would let the ANC paint them as being sell-outs to Apartheid forces. They should end up floating as a small opposition party outside the banner of the Rainbow Coaltion.