Quiet diplomacy and the perpetual right to rule
John Kane-Berman suggests that the reason why the South African government and the African National Congress do not criticise President Robert Mugabe’s behaviour in Zimbabwe is that they in practice endorse his determination to hold on to power. This column appeared in Business Day on 29th March 2007.
Dumisani Khumalo, our ambassador to the United Nations, is actually
right. The situation in Zimbabwe is not a threat to international peace
and security. What President Robert Mugabe is doing to his country is
ruinous but it does not threaten peace beyond his borders. Nor is there
much prospect that Mugabe’s opponents will set up bases in neighbouring
states and launch guerrilla war against him. So there is little chance
of a future threat to security in southern Africa, let alone
internationally. Khumalo then is right on the technicalities. But the
alternative he proposed, referring Zimbabwe to the UN’s Human Rights
Council, is simply feeble, given that this body has shown itself, with
South Africa’s help, to be as selectively blind to human rights
violations as was its predecessor, the Human Rights Commission (where
we previously voted to shield Mugabe from criticism).
South Africa’s policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ has plainly failed. Economic
sanctions are likely to do more harm to Mugabe’s victims than to him.
Less harmful to the people of Zimbabwe would be to turn Mugabe and his
key supporters into pariahs across the continent, an option which even
at this late stage is still open, though unfortunately no more likely
than economic sanctions. In practice Africa’s policy towards Zimbabwe
is to wait for Mugabe to die.
Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad repeatedly says that condemnation
would not help the situation in Zimbabwe. Yet mobilising world opinion
against the apartheid government was a key strategy of the African
National Congress (ANC) until it took power in 1994. It gave hope to
the oppressed, undermined the self-confidence of the oppressors, and
weakened the National Party when negotiations finally got under way
after Nelson Mandela’s release in 1990.
The real indictment of South Africa, however, is not that it has failed
to condemn Mugabe, but that it has all along encouraged him. It did so
right from the start of his campaign of destruction seven years ago. In
2000 we declared his first rigged election to be free and fair. In 2001
when he threw out a journalist we accepted his claim that this was not
a threat to the Press. When he threatened the Bench we said this did
not jeopardise the rule of law. Along with other members of the
Southern African Development Community (SADC), we denied that there
were any human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. We endorsed Mugabe’s attempts
to make the British the scapegoats for his land seizures. Several
ministers said South Africa could learn from his land ‘reforms’
(something we no longer say). We denigrated the Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC) and its leader, Morgan Tsvangirai. In 2002 we endorsed a
second violence-ridden election. We tried in 2003 to have Zimbabwe
re-instated in the Commonwealth after it had been suspended. In 2005,
for the third time, we endorsed a fraudulent election. Only eighteen
months ago we sent South African Air Force jets to join the Zimbabwe
air force’s 25th birthday celebrations. And we sold Mugabe spares for
that air force’s helicopters.
These were all statements or acts of government – aptly symbolised in
photographs of Presidents Mugabe and Mbeki holding hands and laughing
together. In addition the ANC has continued to hail Mugabe’s Zanu-PF as
a sister party, and sent a solidarity delegate to one of its
congresses. It also greeted Mugabe as a conquering hero when he
appeared at Mbeki’s inauguration as president in 2004. Mugabe’s use of
violence to destroy democracy, the economy, human rights, the rule of
law, and political opposition has in practice been publicly encouraged
by both the South African government and the ANC. The question is,
‘Why?’ The usual answer is that there is an unwritten rule that one
liberation movement does not criticise another. But there is a more
worrying possibility. This is that our government and ruling party
share with Mugabe a belief that liberation movements have a perpetual
right to rule. Mugabe intensified his crusade against democracy only
when there were clear signs that his people were turning against him
and he faced the prospect of defeat at the polls. Our government, in
other words, does not wish to be hypocritical and condemn Mugabe when
in its heart of hearts it endorses his desire to stay in power at all
costs.
The implication is that democracy in South Africa is safe only for as
long as it works for the ANC.







