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ANC in revolt is not a real opposition

John Kane-Berman says the recent battle over the ANC leadership was mainly a power struggle, and had less to do with policy differences, except in the macro-economic sphere. This column appeared in Business Day on 21st February 2008.

The dismissal of President Thabo Mbeki from the presidency of the African National Congress (ANC) in Polokwane in December has led several commentators to argue that the real opposition to the government now comes from within the ruling party, not from opposition parties. There is a grain of truth in this, but it is mainly nonsense.

To overthrow its leader – whether Margaret Thatcher or Thabo Mbeki - is a momentous thing for any party to do. Some members of the ANC, along with their allies in the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and South African Communist Party (SACP), detested Mbeki’s macro-economic policies. There was also much unhappiness over his alleged intolerance of dissent within the party.

But on matters of policy the Mbeki government seldom faced much opposition from either his parliamentary caucus or his party at large. A former minister of education, Kader Asmal, last year spoke out against the atrocities committed by President Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, some of them dating back to the 1980s. This belated lone voice aside, Mbeki’s policy of appeasement towards Mugabe has all along had his party’s support. Steal elections, devastate the economy, destroy the rule of law, squash human rights, ruin lives. None of this stopped the ANC, taking its cue from Mbeki, from cheering Mugabe when he jetted into town.

Nor was there much dissent on AIDS. Mbeki flirted with dissident theories and employed an equally misguided health minister, but nobody in the ANC spoke out while they thus trifled with people’s lives. No dissent either when the government stifled the probe into the 1999 arms deal by the standing committee on public accounts (Scopa). Scopa started off its probe in a non-partisan manner. Then Mbeki and the deputy president, Jacob Zuma, weighed in with the help of the ANC chief whip, Tony Yengeni, and the acquiescence of the speaker, Frene Ginwala. Mbeki was not prepared to permit an independent investigation. Nobody in the ANC was willing to stand up for the right – and duty - of Parliament to hold the executive branch of government to account for its expenditure of the public’s money. Since holding the executive to account is a parliamentary function prescribed by the Constitution, this means that the majority party’s willingness to stand up for the Constitution is open to doubt.
Nor is there much prospect that anyone in the ANC will object to plans to destroy the independence of the Scorpions or undermine that of the judiciary.

These are all matters of principle, not party-political issues. But there has been little dissent on key areas of policy either. This includes the pervasive policy of racial preferencing. If black economic empowerment policies have been criticised, it has been on the grounds that they benefit an elite rather than the poor. The increasingly interventionist thrust of the state in education, health, the labour market, and industrial policy has run into little opposition. It would be surprising if this were not so, for these are ANC policies not Mbeki foibles.

The essential point is that however much opposition there might have been to Mbeki from within his party, it was not about policy or principle but about his leadership style and his desire to cling to office. Another key ingredient was no doubt pure vengeance for his dismissal of Zuma.

The worst features of Mbeki’s presidency - Zimbabwe, AIDS, the destruction of Scopa, tolerance of corruption, catastrophic failure on the crime front, the deterioration of public education and public hospitals - have all along sparked minimal dissent within the ANC. It is therefore a delusion to suppose that all the drama before, during, and after Polokwane was a manifestation of the ‘real opposition’ which has been claimed for it. It was nothing more than a power struggle.

Only eighteen months ago Cosatu and the SACP were complaining of a ‘drift towards dictatorship’ and ‘over-centralisation of power’ in the Mbeki presidency. It would be nice to think this was an objection in principle. But the determination of the new leadership in Luthuli House – with SACP officials in key positions – to impose its will on Parliament suggests that the intention is simply to change the identity of the dictator and turn him into a collective.